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EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
METHODOLOGY AFTER RASUL V. BUSH
GERALD L. NEUMAN†
Professor Roosevelt’s thoughtful article reviews the evolution of
doctrine concerning the extraterritorial application of constitutional
rights, identifies Rasul v. Bush1 as marking an opportunity to rethink
prior debates, and sketches a new approach to the problem derived
from the conflict of laws.2  Roosevelt’s analysis engages generously,
while critically, with my own work on this subject.  Although our start-
ing points differ, we agree about many things, including the fact that
new solutions could be useful.  Nonetheless, I have deep reservations
about a conflicts-based approach, as I will explain in this response.
Regarding the implications of the jurisdictional decision in Rasul
for future litigation on the merits, I agree that the majority opinion
strongly suggests in a footnote that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (“Guantanamo”) possess constitutional
rights.3  I agree that the opinion leaves ambiguous the reason why for-
eign nationals have constitutional rights there—whether because they
are human beings in long-term U.S. custody or because of the special
character of U.S. authority at Guantanamo.  And I agree that the an-
swer for the present is more likely to turn on features peculiar to
Guantanamo than on a general exploration of extraterritorial due
process.  In the words of Justice Kennedy’s Rasul concurrence, “Guan-
† Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School.
1
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws:  Rasul and Beyond, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 2017 (2005).
3
The footnote reads:
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Ex-
ecutive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to coun-
sel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe
“custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and cases cited therein.
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15.  The reference to Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
in Verdugo clearly indicates that the defect is constitutional, not statutory or treaty-
based.
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tanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory,”4 al-
though the United States lacks formal sovereignty there.  In one
sense, however, a location-specific holding would not provide the
“narrowest” ground of decision.  Treating the enclave as tantamount
to a territory should entail that the rights of foreign nationals there
are comparable to their rights in overseas territories such as Puerto
Rico or Guam, a fuller set of rights than foreign nationals could claim
in wholly extraterritorial locations.
Even so, the question of extraterritorial rights remains important
after Rasul, both within and outside the context of counterterrorism
efforts.  If the government blundered by bringing its captives to Guan-
tanamo, it may rely more heavily in the future on other, more authen-
tically extraterritorial venues for detention.5  The government may
also relocate its operations for maritime enforcement of U.S. immi-
gration laws against refugees, economic migrants, and smugglers.6
From a general doctrinal perspective, the Rasul majority insisted on
interpreting the dated precedent of Johnson v. Eisentrager7 in accor-
dance with Eisentrager’s holding and context rather than give force to
all its broad-ranging dicta.  This more accurate assessment of Eisen-
trager provides an apt occasion for reexamining the geographical
reach of constitutional limitations.
I.  THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM
Professor Roosevelt and I largely agree about the history of doc-
trinal evolution concerning extraterritorial constitutional rights, and I
will not repeat the narrative here.  By the twentieth century, one cru-
4
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  For a detailed discussion of
the similarity between Guantanamo and earlier nonsovereign territories of the United
States, such as the Panama Canal Zone and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
see Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 15-42
(2004).
5
See, e.g., Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct.
24, 2004, at A1 (noting that “[s]ince the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the CIA has used
broad authority granted in a series of legal opinions and guidance from the Office of
Legal Counsel and its own general counsel’s office to transfer, interrogate and detain
individuals suspected of terrorist activities at a series of undisclosed locations around
the world”); cf. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 464 n.15 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the government declined to confirm or deny facts concerning the custody
of particular detainees with potentially exculpatory information).
6
See Neuman, supra note 4, at 42-43 (describing the use of Guantanamo as a de-
tention site in migrant interdiction operations).
7
339 U.S. 763 (1950).  For criticism of the Eisentrager dicta and their later use, see
Neuman, supra note 4, at 49-50, 54-65.
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cial proposition, from which we both proceed, was settled:  the Consti-
tution as a whole applies everywhere, and is the source of U.S. gov-
ernment power, although particular provisions might have more lim-
ited reach.8  Congress derives its authority from Article I (supplemented
by other provisions and implications), whether it acts with domestic or
extraterritorial effect.  The President derives his authority from Article
II, whether he acts with domestic or extraterritorial effect.9  “[T]he
Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the
actions in question are foreign or domestic.”10  That proposition, how-
ever, does not itself resolve what the Constitution authorizes or for-
bids.  The question remaining to be answered is the scope of particu-
lar provisions limiting those powers, in particular whether provisions
of the Bill of Rights apply to the benefit of citizens or aliens outside
U.S. territory.
To frame the discussion, it would be useful to distinguish among
three approaches to the extraterritorial scope of constitutional rights,
each visible in the various opinions in the Supreme Court’s 1990 deci-
sion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,11 before contrasting them with
Roosevelt’s proposed fourth approach.
The first is the approach apparently taken by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his opinion (essentially for a plurality) in Verdugo.12  In
this model, U.S. citizens have extraterritorial constitutional rights and
8
See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2034 (stating the views of Justice White, which Pro-
fessor Roosevelt implicitly accepts in his analysis).
9
Justice Sutherland’s contrary view expressed in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), that the President exercises extraconstitutional powers
of external sovereignty, has been greatly criticized, and the Court has more commonly
engaged in broad construction of the President’s power under Article II.  See, e.g., Am.
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414-15 (2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s
vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
10
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
11
Id. at 261 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id.
at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12
See id. at 263-74 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).  I say “apparently” because the
opinion is internally contradictory; I characterize it as essentially a plurality because
Justice Kennedy ostensibly provided the fifth vote, while adopting quite a different ap-
proach in his concurring opinion.  See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 105-07 (1996).
Much of the opinion is dictum, and the holding relates only to Fourth Amendment
rights of nonresident aliens.  See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 261, 274-75 (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply “to the search and seizure by United States agents
of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country”).
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foreign nationals do not.  Even as to citizens, the Bill of Rights does
not apply fully and literally overseas, as Justice Black’s plurality opin-
ion in Reid v. Covert had maintained,13 but only partially and contin-
gently, as Justices Frankfurter and Harlan argued in their concur-
rences.14  Aliens, meanwhile, “can derive no comfort from the Reid
holding.”15
The second alternative comes from Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in Verdugo, building differently on Harlan’s methodology in
Reid v. Covert.16  For both citizens and aliens, a contextual, due-process-
style analysis would inquire “which guarantees of the Constitution
should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical ne-
cessities, and the possible alternatives,” and whether conditions would
“make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and
anomalous.”17  As the narrowest explanation of the holding in Verdugo,
this “global due process” approach enjoys precedential support.
Nonetheless, the global due process approach has not yet acquired an
academic theorist who would elaborate and defend it as the best in-
terpretation of U.S. constitutionalism.  In the past, I have criticized its
unpredictability and lack of textual anchor, although I regard it as
normatively superior to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Hobbesian stance.18
The third alternative, appearing in the Verdugo dissents,19 is what I
have called the “mutuality of obligation” approach.  I have defended it
13
354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).  Although Black wrote for only four Justices in Reid, he
acquired majority support in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960), and its companion cases.  The retreat from full extraterritorial applicability of
the Bill of Rights to citizens in Verdugo’s dicta therefore came as a surprise.
14
See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270 (referring to Reid, 354 U.S. at 41 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); 354 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
15
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270.
16
Id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J.,
concurring )).
17
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphases omitted).  Roosevelt
suggests that the “global due process” approach might better be classified as resting on
a “limited government” theory rather than a “fundamental rights” theory.  Roosevelt,
supra note 2, at 2042.  While some passages in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901),
support such a formulation, see, e.g., id. at 293-94 (White, J., concurring) (noting that
“limitations of this character cannot be under any circumstances transcended, because
of the complete absence of power”), the “limited government” rationale is too unin-
formative (as Roosevelt explains), and did not guide the later development of the doc-
trine.
18 See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 113-16.  Given its precedential support, I have
also invoked the global due process analysis in amicus briefs.
19
See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 297-98 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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in my prior work, but I agree that it is not currently the law for foreign
nationals.  Roosevelt describes this approach fairly in his article.  The
mutuality of obligation approach presumes that the extension of U.S.
constitutional rights accompanies the assertion of an obligation to
obey U.S. law, because the framework of rights is designed to legiti-
mate government’s claim to obedience.20  This correlation between
rights and governing authority suggests that constitutional rights
should presumptively apply to all persons within U.S. territory,21 and
to all U.S. citizens in any location, but that extraterritorial rights of
foreign nationals presumptively arise only in contexts where the
United States seeks to impose and enforce its own law.  It would not
necessarily follow that application of a constitutional right produces
identical results in domestic and foreign locations—either for citizens
or for aliens—given that the operative facts and available alternatives
may differ.22
Since the Verdugo decision, lower courts and commentators have
diverged in their efforts to make sense of conflicting implications be-
tween the opinions and within the Chief Justice’s opinion.  Some
courts have embraced the view that dicta in Verdugo exclude any con-
stitutional protection for nonresident aliens outside U.S. territory.
Most graphically, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Due Process
Clause does not protect foreign nationals against torture by U.S.
agents abroad.23  That decision arose from an internal conflict in Gua-
temala, and did not treat the distinction between law enforcement
and non-law-enforcement contexts as relevant.
Against this background, the search continues for a persuasive ac-
count of U.S. constitutionalism that responds adequately to the vastly
20
See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 98-100.  The presumption is rebuttable, where
the text expressly limits the personal or geographical scope of a right, or where struc-
tural arguments demonstrate that the right should not be interpreted as applying.  I
have defended this approach as an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, not as a
substitute for positive law.
21
In this context, it is persuasive to regard areas like the (former) Panama Canal
Zone and Guantanamo as functionally U.S. territory.
22
I have argued, for example, that the First Amendment should impose stricter lim-
its on government regulation of association with domestic political organizations engaged
in violent activity than on government regulation of association with otherwise compa-
rable foreign organizations, because the U.S. government has less opportunity to con-
trol the foreign organizations directly.  See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Depor-
tation, and the First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 330-31
(2000).
23
See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
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increased overseas activity of the federal government since the Second
World War.  A rigidly territorial interpretation of the Constitution
would ignore the effects of economic globalization, extraterritorial
regulation and law enforcement, and delocalized information tech-
nology.  At the same time, advances in communications technology
have greatly decreased the cost of accommodating extraterritorial
rights claims.  If a new approach would better reconcile the needs of
government and the need to constrain governing power, and could
attract a judicial consensus, then it would certainly be welcome.
II.  CAN A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS APPROACH PROVIDE THE SOLUTION?
I have previously criticized the idea of a conflict-of-laws approach
to constitutional interpretation,24 but the relevance of those criticisms
may depend on a preliminary question:  in what sense does Professor
Roosevelt’s article propose a conflict-of-laws approach?
Talk of a conflict-of-laws approach to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of constitutional rights immediately raises two concerns.  First, it
suggests the prospect of a choice between our Constitution and for-
eign law as the measure of government power over individuals.  That
prospect is troublesome for several reasons.  From the individual’s
perspective, it might permit the U.S. government to sink to the level
of a totalitarian state in exercising authority over foreign nationals or
even U.S. citizens in overseas locations.  From the U.S. government’s
perspective, it could have the unacceptable effect of allowing a foreign
government to tighten at will constraints on the power of our legisla-
ture or executive.  Extraterritorial constitutional issues arise when an
otherwise valid congressional statute or executive policy applied be-
yond our borders is challenged as violating a constitutional right.  A
choice between U.S. and foreign law may make sense in deciding
whether or not the congressional statute applies extraterritorially.  But
once it has been determined that the statute does apply, any clash be-
tween the statute and the Constitution must be resolved as a matter of
U.S. law and not foreign law.  Foreign law does not govern as between
the individual and Congress, against the will of Congress.25
24
See Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions?  No Thanks:  A Response to Profes-
sors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. REV. 939 (1993).
25
For clarity, I am not contending that foreign law should always be irrelevant to
the effective content of constitutional norms as applied to U.S. government action in
foreign locations.  For example, if the Fourth Amendment applies extraterritorially to
the search of a U.S. citizen’s person or property, then foreign law may determine what
property the citizen owns, and foreign law may be a relevant factor in deciding
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Second, a “conflict of laws approach” might make subconstitu-
tional positive law (conflicts rules) control the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions.  That would be a dangerous fallacy, because it would
invert the hierarchy of norms presupposed by constitutionalism, and
would authorize Congress to define the limits of its own power.
But this initial reaction largely mistakes the sense in which Profes-
sor Roosevelt is arguing for a conflict-of-laws approach.  Roosevelt
employs a broader concept of conflict of laws, adapted from Dean
Larry Kramer’s work, under which “wholly domestic” conflicts be-
tween two legal rules of the same jurisdiction may be subsumed in the
field of conflicts.26  Elsewhere Roosevelt cites the example of federal
preemption of state law;27 apparently the concept also includes “con-
flicts” between the Constitution and federal statutes.  Like Kramer,
Roosevelt argues for a two-step approach to resolving conflict-of-laws
issues, with a first step that explores the meaning of the allegedly con-
flicting norms to see whether they actually cover the case at hand, and
a second step that resolves the conflict between them if any remains.
Roosevelt calls the first step “scope” analysis and the second step “pri-
ority” analysis.28
Roosevelt explains that the extraterritorial application of constitu-
tional rights should be decided by means of a “scope” analysis, and
that the “priority” step does not arise because there is no potentially
applicable foreign law that governs as between the U.S. government
and aliens in its custody claiming rights.  I agree with the second
point, and also with describing the first issue as one of “scope.”29  Roo-
sevelt continues, quoting Kramer, that “‘the court should determine
what policy a law was enacted to achieve in wholly domestic cases and
ask’ . . . whether its application to a case with foreign elements will
promote its domestic purpose.”30
whether particular expectations of privacy are reasonable.  But foreign law does not
dictate the contours of Fourth Amendment protection.
26
See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 283 (1990);
Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2064-65; Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law:  Re-
thinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2489-93 (1999).
27
See Roosevelt, supra note 26, at 2493-98.
28
Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2064-65.  In an earlier article, he described the two
steps as “rules of scope” and “conflicts rule[s].”  Roosevelt, supra note 26, at 2467-68.
29
See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 4-5.
30
Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2065 (quoting Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:  Extrater-
ritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 213).
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In one sense, who could quarrel with that?  Construing a right in
light of its purposes sounds like an ordinary method of legal interpre-
tation.
Moreover, to the extent that the methodology of conflict of laws
derives from background understandings of the operation of legal sys-
tems at a given period, such understandings have in the past informed
interpretations of the scope of constitutional provisions.  It is not un-
reasonable that they should do so, as long as this form of interpreta-
tion does not permit subconstitutional positive law to dictate the
meaning of constitutional provisions.31
Nonetheless, I am concerned that Roosevelt’s interpretation of
the scope of constitutional rights is affected by the starting point in
“conflict of laws,” and employs assumptions of interest analysis in a
manner that might lead the investigation astray.
Given the acknowledged influence of Larry Kramer’s methodol-
ogy, certain features of Kramer’s exposition deserve attention.
Kramer has described his first-stage inquiry into scope (or “prima facie
applicability”)32 as involving two components:  “(1) ascertaining the
purpose that led to the adoption of a law in wholly domestic cases,
and (2) presuming that the law applies only when that purpose is ad-
vanced in the state.”33  Kramer explains that the second of these com-
ponents “is unique to choice of law,” in that it serves as “a means of
accommodating the laws of other states,” and that it “depends on the
possibility that other laws might also apply.”34  Kramer assumes that
states have an interest in protecting their citizens (or residents)
against harmful acts, and in regulating conduct that occurs within
their borders.  Like many adherents of interest analysis, however, he
deemphasizes the state’s interest in preventing its own citizens from
harming nonresidents outside its borders.  In U.S. interstate cases, this
neglect may often be justified by deference to a sister state’s choices
and the opportunity of applying sister-state law instead.  But applica-
tion of foreign law is not an option in the context we are discussing.
Roosevelt’s “scope” analysis appears similar to Kramer’s in con-
struing the “domestic purpose” of a constitutional right as turning on
its benefit in or for the United States, not on its value to rights-holders
31
Some originalists, for example, might object to allowing changing background
understandings of a given period to supply meaning to unchanging constitutional pro-
visions—but I am not an originalist.
32
Kramer, supra note 26, at 291.
33
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 301-02.
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considered in the abstract or in a context that can be generalized.
That interpretive strategy needs to be defended.
The scope analysis also appears to proceed in isolation, clause by
clause, rather than within an understanding that the set of constitu-
tional rights share any common purpose.  Roosevelt thereby rejects
the assumption, which informs the mutuality of obligation approach,
that constitutional rights form part of a framework for legitimating
the exercise of governing power over individuals.  Conceivably this ad
hoc examination of each right or clause derives from the habits of
conflict of laws, dealing neutrally with unrelated statutes adopted
from time to time by legislatures pursuing whatever policies they wish.
Thus, although Roosevelt’s proposal avoids the manifest defects of
a conflicts process for deciding claims of constitutional right, it retains
enough of conflicts thinking to create a risk that interest analysis will
deflect constitutional interpretation.
III.  THE EXAMPLE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The distorting potential of a conflict-of-laws approach appears
most clearly when Professor Roosevelt’s proposal turns to First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech.  The analysis begins with an
identification of two interests that underlie free speech doctrine:  a
systemic interest in democracy (or collective self-government) and an
individual interest in what he terms “self-actualization.”35  Roosevelt
then argues that aliens’ communications from abroad to Americans
further U.S. self-government, and so may be protected by the First
Amendment, whereas aliens’ communications among themselves
abroad do not further U.S. self-government, and so are not protected
by that rationale.  Moreover, he finds it “hard to see why the Constitu-
tion would be concerned with the self-actualization of aliens abroad,”
and argues, therefore, that a “domiciliary focus seems appropriate.”36
Thus, the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment would not
apply to nonresident aliens’ communications among themselves
abroad.
In other words, we have found ourselves back with the “domicili-
ary focus” endemic to interest analysis.  One might agree that the First
35
Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2066.  For readers to whom “self-actualization” con-
notes egocentric self-indulgence, a different phrasing might be appropriate, but the
choice of term does not matter so long as we take it seriously as an interest central to
individual moral autonomy.
36
Id.
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Amendment does not impose a mandate on the U.S. government to
facilitate aliens’ self-actualization abroad, but is it so clear that no First
Amendment concerns are raised when the government reaches out to
crush aliens’ self-actualization abroad?  It should be emphasized again
that excluding nonresident aliens’ speech from First Amendment pro-
tection does not relegate them to the law of their own domicile, which
cannot control U.S. government action, but rather exposes them to
whatever prohibitions Congress decides to enact.
To make the issue more concrete, we are now guaranteed a long-
term struggle between the United States and terrorists drawn from
Muslim populations that are deeply suspicious of U.S. motives.  Influ-
encing public opinion in those societies may prove important to na-
tional defense.  Suppose that the United States attempts to intervene
in those societies not only by means of aid and publicity but through
extraterritorial criminal laws designed to serve its security interests.
Can Congress—or the Executive—make it a crime for foreign nation-
als in Pakistan, or Indonesia, to criticize U.S. foreign policy to one an-
other, to broadcast videos of Osama Bin Laden, to belong to an Is-
lamist political party, or to “endorse terrorist activity”?37  Can the
United States then enforce such prohibitions against whatever foreign
violators fall into its custody?
I believe it is clear that foreign nationals could not be brought to
the United States and tried on the mainland for such crimes.  That
guarantee, consistent with the First Amendment, would be triggered
by foreign nationals’ presence once brought here to be punished for
speech crimes under U.S. law.38
Suppose instead that the executive acquires custody of foreign na-
tionals in allied countries, and seeks to try them for these crimes at an
37
For the latter, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (2000) (denying admission
to the United States to, inter alia, prominent aliens who “endorse or espouse terrorist
activity . . . in a way that the Secretary of State has determined undermines United
States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities”).
38
See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 684-85, 692 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
First Amendment free speech doctrine in upholding the conviction of a noncitizen for
extraterritorial conduct in instructing Central Americans on how to cross the border
illegally and seek sanctuary in the United States), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
Prosecution under U.S. law for speech crimes would raise issues quite different from
those raised by U.S. judicial enforcement of a foreign judgment under foreign law.  Cf.
Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying recognition to a
U.K. libel judgment, partly on First Amendment grounds), aff’d on other grounds, 159
F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflicts
of Law:  Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821-22
(2005).
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extraterritorial location—either Guantanamo, or if that is not extra-
territorial, then Diego Garcia.  When I first wrote about these issues,
extraterritorial criminal trials, prisons, and executions at Guantanamo
seemed like an academic hypothetical, but that is no longer the case.
Roosevelt’s analysis appears to entail that the defendants would have
no First Amendment rights to raise against such a prosecution.
Imposing criminal liability under U.S. law for core political speech
of allied nationals in allied territory should be as constitutionally
troubling as denying due process to suspected terrorists, which Roose-
velt would condemn as a violation of extraterritorial Fifth Amendment
rights.39  The mutuality of obligation approach (which is not currently
the law) would extend First Amendment protection in this context.  It
is also very possible that Justice Kennedy’s global due process ap-
proach would similarly extend protection, since I cannot identify any-
thing “impracticable or anomalous” about respecting core political
speech of allied nationals in allied territory.
Indeed, it is even possible that Roosevelt’s conflict-of-laws ap-
proach would forbid some prosecutions for speech crimes, on Fifth
Amendment rather than First Amendment grounds, if the censorship
were so egregious that the Supreme Court would recoil from the con-
clusion that we are the “kind of a people [who] would do such a
thing.”40  The prohibition would apply, apparently, not because free-
dom of speech as we define it represents one of our fundamental val-
ues, but rather because some minimal level of respect for “the most
basic rights of our alien friends”41 forms part of our self-image as a de-
cent society.  This conclusion is conceivable, but not certain.  Perhaps
extraterritorial censorship that bears a rational relationship to na-
tional defense is not so despotic as to offend this proposed interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Amendment.
To be sure, I have criticized the global due process approach for
its lack of textual anchor and its unpredictability.  But I am not able to
see the varying answers that Professor Roosevelt’s article gives to dif-
ferent constitutional provisions as evidencing a more consistent and
predictable methodology either.  Unfortunately, I suspect that this
comes about because the field of conflict of laws is more in need of
methodology than itself a source of methodology.
39
See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2055-56.
40
Id. at 2068-69.
41
Id.
